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When simple alternatives to Bayes formula work well: Reducing the cognitive 
load when updating probability forecasts 
 
 
Abstract 
 
     Bayes theorem is the normative method for revising probability forecasts when 
new information is received. However, for unaided forecasters its application can be  
difficult, effortful, opaque and even counter-intuitive. Two simple heuristics are 
proposed for approximating Bayes formula while yielding accurate decisions. Their 
performance was assessed: i) where a decision is made on which of  two events is 
most probable and ii) where a choice is made between an option yielding an 
intermediate utility for certain or a gamble which will result in either a worse or better 
utility (‘certainty or risk’ decisions). For ‘most probable event’ decisions the first 
heuristic always results in the correct decision when the reliability of the new 
information does not depend on which event will occur. In other cases the second 
heuristic typically led to the correct decision for about 95% of ‘most probable event’ 
decisions and 86% of ‘certainty or risk’ decisions. 
 
Keywords: Bayes theorem, forecasting, heuristics, probability estimation
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When simple alternatives to Bayes formula work well: Reducing the cognitive 
load when updating probability forecasts 
 
1.1 Introduction 
     Forecasts are often expressed as probabilities and, when new information is 
received, Bayes theorem provides the normative way of revising these prior 
probabilities. For example, economic forecasters may revise their subjective 
probabilities of a recession upwards if an economic leading indicator suggests that a 
decline in growth is on the horizon (Schnader and Stekler 1998).  Similarly, estimates 
of the probability of success of a potential new product may be revised upwards when 
encouraging market research results become available. Many situations involve 
estimating probabilities for two mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, A and A  
(e.g., recession or no recession or rain or no rain). In this case Bayes theorem can be 
stated as: 
 
  P(A|N)  =   Po(A) x P(N|A)    (1) 
    Po(A) x P(N|A) + (1-Po(A)) x P(N| A ) 
 
Where: Po(A) is the prior probability of event A 
 P(A|N)   is the posterior probability of A 
 A  is the event which is complementary to A 
 N = the new information 
P(N|A) is the likelihood of the new information, or the probability of getting 
the new information given that A will occur 
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     Where p(N|A) = 1 –p(N| A ) the new information will be referred to as a 
‘symmetric indicator’. For example, suppose that a test will indicate whether a 
manufactured component is defective or non-defective. If it has the same probability 
of giving a correct indication irrespective of whether or not a component is defective 
then it will provide a symmetric indication of the component’s condition.  If this 
condition does not apply then the new information is an ‘asymmetric indicator’. 
     Applying Bayes theorem can pose difficulties for unaided forecasters. The 
cognitive effort involved in using the formula may make it unacceptable when a quick 
decision needs to be made or when a calculator is unavailable. To those unfamiliar 
with probability theory the formula may lack transparency and hence there may be a 
distrust of the posterior probability produced by it. For example, suggestions that 
jurors should use Bayes theorem to determine the probability of a defendant’s guilt 
have never been widely implemented because of the difficulties involved in getting  
people to apply it, or accept it, even when they are provided with a structured format 
(Balding 1997). There is also plenty of evidence that, in many circumstances, people 
do not naturally revise probabilities according to Bayes theorem. 
     These factors suggest that it may be worth trying to develop simple, but reliable, 
approximations to Bayes theorem, which people could be encouraged to employ when 
use of the exact formula is impractical.  This paper therefore addresses two questions.  
 
1. Is it possible to identify simple and intuitively appealing heuristics that will 
approximate  Bayes theorem and lead to the same decisions in a wide  range of 
circumstances? 
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2.  Under what conditions, if any, would the use of these heuristics lead to serious 
errors? 
 
2.1 Background 
     Some researchers have assumed in their models of  human prediction and decision 
making that people revise their prior beliefs according to (1) (e.g., Schnader and 
Stekler 1998). However, a substantial body of research has found that in many 
circumstances this is not the case. A predominant finding of the literature of the 1960s 
was that people are conservative in that they insufficiently revise their prior 
probabilities when they receive diagnostic new information when compared to the 
revisions prescribed by the theorem (e.g., Phillips and Edwards 1966; Phillips et al. 
1966; Edwards 1968). Later work has suggested the opposite in that people 
underweight  prior probabilities and make their judgment primarily on how 
representative the new information appears to be of  either A or A  (Grether 1992; 
Mahmoud and Grether 1995; Charness, Karni and Levin, 2007; Holt and Smith 2009). 
The difference between these findings may, in part, reflect whether the prior 
probabilities were estimated by the forecaster themselves or whether they were 
supplied to them (other factors, like incentives for accurate judgment, may also have 
played a role).  A self-estimated prior probability would be likely to carry greater 
salience and hence greater weight in the revision process than a supplied probability 
(e.g. Phillips and Edwards 1966; Evans, Handley and Over 2002). Indeed, it may act 
as an anchor in an “anchor and adjustment” process (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  
     Recent research by Goodwin et al. (2013) suggests a simple model can  represent  
people’s revisions to their own prior probabilities. This model is a weighted average 
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of the prior probability and the likelihood  associated with the new information when 
A occurs: 
P(A|N) = 0.66 Po(A) +  0.41 P(N|A)    (2) 
In all cases examined by Goodwin et al. (2013) the new information was a symmetric 
indicator.  The estimated weights of 0.66 and 0.41 were obtain by applying 
generalized estimating equations to the prior and posterior probability estimates of  54  
participants in an experiment. Each participant judged the probability of a recession in 
nine scenarios both before and after receiving information from an economic 
indicator. 
     Barbey and Sloman (2007) discuss a number of theoretical accounts of how 
Bayesian estimation can be facilitated. There is strong evidence that people are likely 
to revise their prior probabilities more accurately when information is presented in a 
natural frequency, rather than a probability, format (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995; 
Cosmides and Tooby 1996; Koehler 1996; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, 
Schwartz and Woloshin 2007). Goodwin and Wright (1991) demonstrated this 
method and it was discussed by Kleiter (1992). Gigerenzer (2011) defines a natural 
frequency as a joint frequency of two events. For example, it could be the number of 
components manufactured in a factory that are both defective and have been found to 
be defective in a quality control test that is not perfectly reliable. Figure 1 shows how 
1000 typical components could lead to four natural frequencies depending on whether 
or not they are defective and whether or not they have failed the  test (the natural 
frequencies are at the bottom of the tree). The probability that a component is 
defective, given that it has failed the test, can be easily determined from the diagram. 
Of the 140 components that failed the test, 110 are defective. Hence the required 
probability is simply calculated as 110/140 = 78.6%.  
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Figure 1 here 
 
     Why do natural frequencies make Bayesian revision easier? One theory is that 
humans have evolved a component of their brain that efficiently processes natural 
frequency information (Gigerenzer 2000) (Chapter 4). The frequency with which 
events are experienced has been the natural way in which humans (and even animals) 
have obtained information on the risks they face throughout their evolution, while the 
use of probabilities is relatively recent (Gigerenzer 2002). In addition, the natural 
frequency format may allow decision makers to have an accurate perception of the set 
structure underlying the necessary calculation (see Evans, Handley, Perham, Over and 
Thompson 2000; Barbey and Sloman 2007). The use of Euler diagrams to represent 
the set structure has also been found to aid Bayesian inference (Sloman, Over, Slovak 
and Stibel 2003). 
     However, in some circumstances in may be difficult or unnatural to conceive the 
problem in terms of a large population of repeated similar events. For example, 
consider the task of estimating the probability that an innovative new product will 
make a profit, given that market research has indicated that it will, or the probability 
that a specific construction project will be delayed given that geological tests have 
indicated problems with the local rock structure.  On other occasions decision makers 
may not have the time, commitment or even the need to estimate perfectly accurate 
Bayesian posterior probabilities, particularly as decision problems often have a wide 
degree of tolerance to errors in the underlying probability estimates (von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards 1986). Also, the importance of getting the decision right may not be 
regarded as crucial, so the need to avoid  an erroneous choice does not justify the 
effort required to estimate correct probabilities (Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1993). 
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Indeed, in some circumstances where judgments are applied to decisions greater effort 
may even lead to less accurate judgments (e.g., see Katsikopoulos (2011) for a 
review). All of this suggests that there may be a useful role for heuristics that can 
handle information in the form of probabilities and yet be cognitively less demanding 
than Bayes formula. Ideally, the heuristics should be intuitively reasonable and carry 
an acceptably low risk of yielding the wrong decision. 
     When the heuristic (2) reported in Goodwin, et al. (2013) was applied to a range of 
decisions, discrepancies between decisions based on probabilities revised according to 
Bayes theorem and those based on the heuristic were relatively rare. Moreover, when 
they occurred they were generally inconsequential in that the differences between the 
expected utilities of the decision based on Bayes theorem and those of the discrepant 
decision were small. This finding raises the possibility of being able to recommend to 
decision makers a simple rule or rules that will accord with their natural way of 
thinking and will give them a high probability of making a correct decision. This 
possibility is explored next in the context of two types of decision. 
 
2.1  Deciding which event is most probable 
     On many occasions people have to decide which of two mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive events is most likely to occur.   Is it more probable that the price of a stock 
will rise rather than fall over the next month?  Is economic growth over the next three 
years more probable than a decline in GDP? Is a default by a debtor more probable 
than no default? Is it more probable that tomorrow will be a rain-free day or a day 
when some precipitation will occur?  
     This choice is shown in the simple decision tree in figure 2 where a forecast of A, 
F(A), would be chosen if event A is most probable and a forecast of A    (i.e., F( A ) ) 
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would be chosen otherwise.  The probability of A is w and the 0’s and 1’s are the 
decision maker’s utilities for the worst and best outcomes respectively (assume that 
utilities are measured on a 0 to 1 scale throughout this paper). These utilities assume 
that correctly forecasting the event is equally good irrespective of which option is 
chosen. For example, it assumes that the forecaster will be just as satisfied with a 
correct forecast of rain and a correct forecast of fine weather.  Similarly, choosing the 
wrong option is assumed to be equally bad, irrespective of which event actually 
occurs. When new information is received let w = pB if the Bayesian posterior 
probability is used to make the decision and w = pE if the decision maker’s estimate of 
the posterior probability is used.  The decision will differ only if pE >0.5 when pB 
<0.5 or when pE <0.5 when pB >0.5, that is when the decision maker’s probability and 
the Bayesian posterior probability are on ‘opposite’ sides of 0.5. 
Figure 2  here  
     When the decisions do differ how serious will this be? Expected utility loss is the 
expected loss in the decision maker’s satisfaction caused by the discrepancy. It is the 
difference between the expected utility of the best option and the option selected, with 
both expected utilities calculated using the correct Bayes posteriors.  For ‘most 
probable event’ decisions it is  |2pB -1| . This is because if F(A) is the correct decision 
then the expected utility is pB. An incorrect choice of  F( A ) would yield an expected 
utility of 1- pB so the difference (or utility loss) is pB-(1-pB) = 2pB-1. When F( A ) is 
the correct choice the utility loss is 1-2pB. 
 
2.1.1 Symmetric indicator 
     Consider first situations where the new information is a symmetric indicator.  The 
model in (2) suggests  a very simple heuristic: Take the Average: 
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P(A|N) = 0.5 Po(A) +  0.5 P(N|A)    (3) 
Here the revised probability is just the mean of the prior probability and the likelihood 
associated with the event in question. If the result exceeds 0.5 then A is considered to 
be the most probable event. For example, suppose that a forecaster estimates the prior 
probability of a recession in the next year, Po(A) to be 0.2.  An economic forecast is 
then published which predicts that there will be a recession in the next year. Suppose 
also that the probability of  the forecast predicting a recession given that there will be 
a recession, P(N|A),  is 0.7.  The simple heuristic yields an estimated posterior 
probability of a recession of 0.45. Since this probability is less than 0.5, a person 
using the heuristic would conclude that “no recession” is the more probable event. If 
the economic forecast is a symmetric indicator, Bayes theorem yields a posterior 
probability of 0.37 so a person using the theorem would agree that “no recession” is 
more probable. 
     How well would Take the Average work in general when applied to a ‘most 
probable event’ decision and when the indication is symmetric? In fact, it would give 
the same decision as Bayes theorem 100% of the time, as shown below. When the 
posterior probability P(A|N) is greater than 0.5, according to Bayes theorem: 
 
 Po(A)  P(N|A)       > 0.5  (4) 
Po(A)  P(N|A) + [1-Po(A)][1- P(N|A)] 
 
So:   2 Po(A)  P(N|A) > Po(A)  P(N|A) + [1-Po(A)] [1- P(N|A)]   (5) 
 
This expression simplifies to:  
Po(A) + P(N|A) > 1    or  0.5 Po(A) +  0.5 P(N|A)  > 0.5    (6) 
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2.1.2 Asymmetric indicator 
     Take the Average cannot be guaranteed to yield the correct decision when an 
indicator is asymmetric. This is because it is ignoring the value of P(N| A ) so it would 
give the same result irrespective of what this likelihood is.  For example, consider the 
forecasting problem referred to above, where the prior probability of a recession is 
0.2. Suppose that the economic forecast has a 0.7 probability of forecasting a 
recession when there will be  a recession, but only a 0.05 probability  of forecasting a 
recession when “no recession” will occur so that P(N|A) = 0.7 but P(N| A ) = 0.05. 
The heuristic’s posterior probability of 0.45 will be on the ‘opposite side’ of 0.5 when 
compared to the Bayes posterior of 0.78. 
     In this case is it possible to derive an alternative heuristic which takes into account 
all of the information? When an indicator is asymmetric a perfectly correct decision 
can be guaranteed if the following procedure is followed. 
 
1. Divide P(N| A )  by the sum of the likelihoods 
 
2.  Choose A as being most probable only if the prior probability Po(A) exceeds this 
ratio. 
 
 
     In the last version of the recession forecasting problem this procedure would result 
in 0.05/0.75 = 0.07. Hence a recession would be considered to be the most probable 
event as Po(A) = 0.2 so the decision would agree with that based on Bayes formula. 
This works because, when the posterior probability, P(A|N), exceeds 0.5. 
 
Po(A) P(N|A) >  [1-Po(A)] P(N| A )       (7) 
 
 
    so: Po(A) >  P(N| A )/[ P(N|A)  +  P(N| A )]     (8) 
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     Although these steps are guaranteed to give the correct decision and involve less 
effort that the application of the Bayes formula they may still be too complex for an 
unaided decision maker. If this is the case a simpler heuristic, Sum the Pros, Sum the 
Cons, will often give good approximate results as shown below. 
 
     Note that the left hand side of the inequality in (4) is the product of the 
probabilities ‘favouring’ A. For example the second term is the probability of 
obtaining the new information if A will occur. The right hand side is the product of 
the probabilities ‘disfavouring’ A. The comparison in (4) will be easier if sums 
replace the products, that is if the sum of ‘favouring’ probabilities (the ‘pros’) exceed 
the ‘disfavouring’ probabilities (the ‘cons’). This approximation should work well 
because if: 
    a.b>(1-a)c 
 
 it is likely that   a +b >(1-a) + c  when   0< a,b,c < 1.0. 
 
Indeed this proved to be the case in over 96% of cases when it was tested over all 
combinations of a, b and c with the values varying in steps of 0.01 (Similarly when  
a +b >(1-a) + c  then a.b>(1-a)c in over 94% of cases).  Thus the Sum the Pros, Sum 
the Cons heuristic is:  assume A is more probable than  A  if : 
Po(A) +  P(N|A) >  [1-Po(A)]  + P(N| A )]   (9) 
For the last version of the recession forecasting example the left hand side is  0.9 
(0.2+0.7) and a right hand side of  0.85 (0.8 + 0.05) so the heuristic agrees with the 
Bayes posterior that  a recession is more probable than no recession.  It can be seen 
that Sum the Pros, Sum the Cons is a generalisation of Take the Average as, if the 
indication from the new information is symmetric, the sum of all four probabilities in 
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(6) will be two so the left hand side will have an average exceeding 0.5 when A is the 
more probable event. 
     Sum the Pros, Sum the Cons was tested for ‘most probable event’ decisions across 
the following ranges of values (these will be referred to as the test set for most 
probable event decisions): 
 prior probabilities,   Po(A),   from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.01  
 values of P(N|A) from 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01  
 values of P(N| A ) from 0.01 and 0.99 in steps of 0.01. 
 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of times the heuristic led to a discrepancy with 
decisions based on  Bayes for different prior probabilities. 
 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
 
     The heuristic performed at its worst if the prior probability is 0.3 or 0.7, when 
about 8.5% of decisions were discrepant (i.e., about 91.5% of decisions were still 
correct). Overall, only 5.5% of decisions differed from those based on Bayes theorem 
(i.e., 94.5% agreed). Note that the disagreements are minimised when the prior 
probability is at the extremes or close to 0.5. Extreme priors will tend to lead to 
posterior probabilities which are either well below  or well above 0.5  using both 
Bayes formula and the heuristic so there will usually be no disagreement between the 
two on which is the most probably event.  If the prior probability for event A is 0.5 
then, according to Bayes rule, A will be more probable than A  if P(N|A) >P(N| A ).  
Under these circumstances, Sum the Pros, Sum the Cons is always bound to agree 
with Bayes rule because it would indicate that A is more probable if  0.5 + P(N|A) > 
0.5 + P(N| A ) which will only be true if P(N|A) >P(N| A ). 
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     These results suggest that the risk of wrongly identifying the most probable event 
when using this heuristic is low. But how serious are the discrepancies?  When 
discrepancies occurred the expected utility loss was, on average, 0.21 indicating that  
typically the loss of satisfaction by the decision maker was 21% of the difference 
between the utilities of the worst and best possible outcomes. However, given that 
discrepancies were rare, over all decisions the expected utility loss was only 0.01. 
 
2.2 Choosing between a certain or risky alternative 
     Figure 4 displays a decision tree for a second commonly encountered type of 
decision problem. Here the decision maker has to choose between a ‘risk free’ option 
and a gamble which will result in either a worse or better outcome than the risk free 
option. Specifically the decision involves two alternative courses of action D1 and D2. 
Alternative D1 can result in two outcomes A and A . The utilities that can be obtained 
are  shown at the ends of the branches and range from 0 (the worst outcome) to 1 the 
best with 0<U<1.   Note that D2 always leads to a utility of U. The probability of  the 
best  outcome, A , is x.        
Figure 4 here  
 
     If the decision maker receives new information relating to the probability of 
outcome A then let x = pB if the Bayesian posterior probability is used to make the 
decision and x = pE if the decision maker’s estimate of the posterior probability is 
used. According to the axioms of utility theory  (e.g., see Goodwin and Wright 
(2014)) the decision maker will be indifferent between D1 and D2  when U = x. 
Discrepant decisions will therefore be made if: pE > U when pB  < U or vice versa, 
that is when pE  and pB  are on ‘opposite  sides’ of U. The expected utility loss of a 
discrepant decision will be the difference between expected utilities of the correct and 
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incorrect decisions based on the Bayes probabilities, that is:  |U - pB|. For example, if 
D1 is the correct decision and D2 is chosen then the utility loss will be: 1.pB +0.(1- pB) 
–U = pB –U. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Symmetric indicator 
     The performance of Take the Average was tested on ‘certainty or risk’ decisions 
when the indication from the new information was symmetric.  This testing was done 
for all combinations of values of Po(A) and p(N|A) from 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01 
when U =0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. The estimate of the posterior probability was 
simply: 0.5 [(Po(A) + p(N|A) ].  Over all values the heuristic yielded a decision that 
agreed with the one based on Bayes theorem on 86.3% of occasions (see figure 5) and 
the mean expected utility loss was only 0.008.  When U =0.5 there was 100% 
agreement between the Bayes decision and the heuristic. Less than 70% agreement 
occurred where both U and Po(A) were low (e.g., U<0.1 and Po(A)<0.2) or  both high 
(e.g., U>0.9 and Po(A)>0.8) with the agreement percentage getting worse as the pairs 
of values became more extreme. In these situations the expected utilities  of  A and  
A  will tend to be close so there is a greater chance of a discrepancy, though the 
expected utility loss of any discrepancy will be low. On average the mean expected 
utility loss when discrepancies occurred was only 0.085. It is interesting to note the 
weighted average heuristic (2) typically adopted by participants in the study by 
Goodwin et al. (2013), which is similar to Take the Average, was well adapted to the 
task. 
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2.2.2 Asymmetric indicator 
     The performance of Sum the Pros, Sum the Cons was tested on  ‘certainty or risk’ 
decisions when the indication from the new information was asymmetric. In this case  
the  posterior probability was obtained as: 
P(A|N) =      Po(A) +  P(N|A)     (10) 
Po(A) +  P(N|A) + [1-Po(A)]  + P(N| A )] 
   
This is Bayes formula (1) with sums replacing products. It may look complex for a 
heuristic but it is simply:     
     Sum of the Pros 
      Sum of the Pros and Cons 
 
     When the indication  is symmetric it simplifies to Take the Average. The heuristic 
was tested on ‘certainty or risk’ decisions  for all combinations of values of Po(A) , 
p(N|A) and P(N| A ) from 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01 when U =0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 
0.9. Combinations where P(N|A) = 1 -P(N| A ) were excluded.  The performance was 
very similar to that when the indicator was symmetric. Over all values the heuristic 
yielded a decision that agreed with the one based on Bayes theorem on 85.6%  of 
occasions and the mean expected utility loss was only 0.013. Figure 5 shows the 
percentage of occasions when the heuristic disagreed with the Bayes decision for  the 
different values of Po(A). As before, levels of agreement were below 70% when both 
U and Po(A) were low (e.g., U<0.1 and Po(A)<0.15) or  both were  high (e.g., U>0.9 
and Po(A)>0.85). When there were discrepancies the mean expected utility loss  was 
0.091 
 
Figure 5 here 
 
3. Discussion and Conclusions 
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     Bayes theorem is the normative method for revising probabilities when new 
information is received so the heuristics cannot surpass it in terms of accuracy. 
However, they can be superior in terms of the cognitive effort that they require and in 
their acceptability to decision makers. Decision makers seek to balance the cognitive 
effort they put into their decisions against the desire to maximise the chances of 
making the correct choice (Payne et al. 1993). If a heuristic has a high probability of 
leading to an accurate choice and involves relatively little cognitive effort it is likely 
to be acceptable. However, acceptability may also depend on the  intuitive 
reasonableness of  the heuristic  -does it appear to make sense? For example, it is 
known that company sales forecasters tend to make too many judgmental adjustments 
to the statistical forecasts generated by their computer systems (Fildes, Goodwin, 
Lawrence and Nikolopoulos 2009). Yet the least effortful strategy would be merely to 
accept these forecasts without change. It seems that many of the adjustments are made 
because the forecasters do not understand the algorithms that have generated the 
statistical forecasts or their rationale. They regard them as a ‘black box’. In particular, 
they perceive patterns in the random movements in sales time series and see the 
computer system’s discounting of these movements as lacking intuitive 
reasonableness. As a result the forecasts are deemed to be unacceptable and they are 
changed. The heuristics presented above  do appear to meet the three requirements of  
i) requiring less mental effort to implement than Bayes theorem, ii) providing a high 
chance of yielding an accurate choice, and iii) being intuitively reasonable. 
     Decisions often have what von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) refer to as ‘flat 
maxima’, that is the optimum choice is relatively insensitive to errors in the estimates 
of probabilities and utilities.  The heuristics are able to exploit this property. This 
tolerance is particularly evident for ‘most probable event’ decisions. In particular, 
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when the indicator is symmetric it is just not worth going to the effort of applying the 
Bayes formula. Take the average will guarantee perfect accuracy. In other cases the 
use of the heuristics clearly would not be advisable. This will be the case in a 
‘certainty or risk’ decision when both the prior probability, Po(A), and the utility, U 
are both very low or both very high. For example, when Po(A) = 0.02 and U = 0.1  
Sum the Pros, Sum the Cons has a 77% probability of indicating the wrong choice 
(when averaged over all values of P(N|A) and p(N| A ). As a rule of thumb, if both 
values are below 0.2 or both are above 0.8 the heuristic should be avoided. The extent 
to which the heuristics should be used in between these extremes of good and bad 
performance is, of course a judgment call.  In many situations a heuristic providing an  
85% probability  of an accurate decision is likely to be acceptable, given  the reduced 
cognitive effort involved. It will clearly not be when decisions are of high importance 
(e.g., life and death decisions). 
     Interestingly, this notion of using simple rules, based on averages and sums, to 
update prior estimates was suggested in the 1950’s in the context of regression 
analysis.  Armstrong (1985) describes an approach which he terms the ‘poor man’s 
Bayesian regression analysis’.  It involves a first step where a priori estimates of a 
model’s coefficients are averaged with those estimated using regression analysis (e.g., 
using least squares). When Tessier and Armstong (2014) applied the approach to sales 
estimation in the US lodging market they found that it improved the accuracy of the 
estimates, while at the same time incurring little cost. 
     The analysis presented in this paper has a number of limitations. It was assumed 
that the new information, N, was received correctly, and more importantly, that 
P(N|A) and P(N| A ) are also known correctly. Nevertheless, there are many 
circumstances where P(N|A) and P(N| A ) are likely to be known. For example, the 
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accuracy of  medical tests or electronic tests used in quality control is often known, 
while information on the accuracy of weather forecasts is widely available. Where 
these values are not known exactly an error in their estimation would apply equally to 
Bayes formula and to the heuristics so their relative accuracy would remain 
unchanged.  Nevertheless, there is potentially scope for the development of heuristics 
to support the estimation of likelihoods. Secondly,  for a given prior probability 
Po(A), when the indication from the   new information was asymmetric, the results 
assumed that all combinations of values of P(N|A) and P(N| A ) between 0.01 and 
0.99 were equally likely to apply (i.e., a bivariate uniform distribution was assumed). 
In practical problems particular combinations of  these values may be more common, 
but it is of course, difficult, if not impossible, to establish this.  In addition, the 
research has only considered decisions with two options and up to two  discrete 
outcomes, though these types of decisions are likely to be commonly encountered in 
practice.  
     Probability forecasts are important in many practical contexts. Taken together, the 
results provide strong evidence that, when these forecasts involve revisions based on 
new information, simpler can often be best. 
 
20 
 
 
References 
Armstrong J. S. Long range Forecasting. From Crystal Ball to Computer. New York: 
John Wiley, 1985. 
Balding D. Probable cause. The Times Higher 1997; October 24: 23. 
Barbey A. K., Sloman S. A. Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual 
processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2007; 30 (3): 241-+. 
Charness G., Karni E., Levin D. Individual and group decision making under risk: An 
experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order 
stochastic dominance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2007; 35 (2): 129-148. 
Cosmides L., Tooby J. Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking 
some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. 
Cognition 1996; 58 (1): 1-73. 
Edwards W. Conservatism in human information processing. In: B.Kleinmuntz editor. 
Formal Representation of Human Judgment. New York: Wiley, 1968. pp. 17-
52. 
Evans J. St., Handley S. J., Over D. E., Perham N. Background beliefs in Bayesian 
inference. Memory & Cognition 2002; 30 (2): 179-190. 
Evans J. St., Handley S. J., Perham N., Over D. E., Thompson V. A. Frequency versus 
probability formats in statistical word problems. Cognition 2000; 77 (3): 197-
213. 
Fildes R., Goodwin P., Lawrence M., Nikolopoulos K. Effective forecasting and 
judgmental adjustments: an empirical evaluation and strategies for 
improvement in supply-chain planning. International Journal of Forecasting 
2009; 25 (1): 3-23. 
21 
 
 
Gigerenzer G. Adaptive thinking: rationality in the real world. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
Gigerenzer G. Reckoning with risk. London: Penguin Books, 2002. 
Gigerenzer G. The art of risk communication. What are natural frequencies? British 
Medical Journal 2011; 343. 
Gigerenzer G., Gaissmaier W., Kurz-Milcke E., Schwartz L.M., Woloshin S.W. 
Helping doctors and patients make sense of health statistics. Psychological 
Science in the Public Interest 2007; 8: 53-96. 
Gigerenzer G., Hoffrage U. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction - 
frequency formats. Psychological Review 1995; 102 (4): 684-704. 
Goodwin P. , Önkal D., Stekler H. O. Does it matter if decision makers’ probability 
assessments do not conform to Bayes’ theorem when they are facing risky 
decisions? University of Bath, School of Management, Working Paper 2013. 
Goodwin P., Wright G. Decision Analysis for Management Judgment, 1st edition. 
Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 1991 pp166-167. 
Goodwin P., Wright G. Decision Analysis for Management Judgment, 5th edition. 
Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 2014. 
Grether D.M. Testing Bayes rule and the representativeness heuristic: Some 
experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1992; 
17: 31-57. 
Holt C. A., Smith A. M. An update on Bayesian updating. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 2009; 69 (2): 125-134. 
Katsikopoulos K. V. Psychological Heuristics for Making Inferences: Definition, 
Performance, and the Emerging Theory and Practice. Decision Analysis 2011; 
8 (1): 10-29. 
22 
 
 
Kleiter G.D. Natural sampling: rationality without base rates. In: G.H Fischer, G. 
Laming editors. Contributions to Mathemetical Psychology, Psychometrics 
and Methodology. New York: Springer-Verlag 1994. pp. 375-388. 
Koehler J. J. The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and 
methodological challenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1996; 19 (1): 1-&. 
Mahmoud A.A., Grether D.M. Are people Bayesian? Uncovering behavioral 
strategies. Journal of the American Statistical Association 1995; 90: 1137-
1145. 
Payne J. W., Bettman J. R., Johnson E. J. The Adaptive Decision Maker. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Phillips L. D., Edwards W. Conservatism in a simple probability inference task. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 1966; 72: 346-367. 
Phillips L. D., Hays W.L., Edwards W. Conservatism in Complex Probabilistic 
Inference. IEEE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics 1966; 7: 7-18. 
Schnader M. H., Stekler H. O. Sources of turning point forecast errors. Applied 
Economics Letters 1998; 5 (8): 519-521. 
Sloman S. A., Over D., Slovak L., Stibel J. M. Frequency illusions and other fallacies. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 2003; 91 (2): 296-
309. 
Tessier T.H., Armstong J.S. Decomposition of time-series forecasts by current level  
 and change: effects on accuracy. Journal of Business Research 2014; (this  
 issue). 
Tversky A., Kahneman D. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science 
1974; 185: 1124-1131. 
23 
 
 
von Winterfeldt D., Edwards W. Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Using natural frequencies to estimate posterior probabilities 
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Figure 2  Decision tree for identifying the most probable event  
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Figure 3 The performance of Sum the Pros, Sum the Cons when the indicator is 
asymmetric 
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Figure 4.  Decision tree for choosing between options with certain and risky 
outcomes where D2 always leads to a utility of U. 
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Figure 5 The performance of Take the Average and Sum the Pros, Sum the Cons 
for ‘certainty or risk’ decisions 
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